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Abstract: 
Embodiment is a fact of human existence which philosophers should not ignore.  They may differ to a 
great extent in what they have to say about our bodies, but they have to take into account that for each 
of us our body has a special status, it is not merely one amongst the physical objects, but a physical object 
to which we have a unique relation.  While Descartes approached the issue of embodiment through 
consideration of sensation and imagination, it is more directly reached by consideration of action and 
agency: whenever we act upon the world, we act by moving our bodies.  So if we can understand what 
an immaterialist such as Berkeley thinks about agency, we will have gone a fair way to understanding 
what he thinks about embodiment. §1 discusses a recent flurry of articles on the subMHFWRI%HUNHOH\¶V
account of action. I choose to present Berkeley as a causal-volitional theorist (realist) not because I think 
it is the uniquely correct interpretation of the texts, but because I find it more philosophically interesting 
as a version of immaterialism. In particular, it raises the possibility of a substantive account of human 
embodiment which is completely unavailable to the occasionalist.  §2 articulates an apparent 
philosophical problem for Berkeley qua causal-volitional theorist and show that Locke was aware of a 
related problem and had a solution of which Berkeley would have known.  §3 distinguishes two 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI%HUNHOH\¶VIDPRXVGHQLDORIEOLQGDJHQF\± as the assertion of a weak representational 
condition or a strong epistemic one ± and provide evidence that there was a well-established debate about 
blind powers in the 17th century which took the metaphor of blindness as indicating an epistemic rather 
than merely representational failing.  What remains to do in §4 is to consider whether Berkeley, with his 
own peculiar commitments, could in fact accept this account of agency. 
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µ:HDUHFKDLQHGWRDERG\¶%HUNHOH\ 
 
 
Embodiment is a fact of human existence which philosophers should not ignore.  They 
may differ to a great extent in what they have to say about our bodies, but they have to 
take into account that for each of us our body has a special status, it is not merely one 
amongst the physical objects, but a physical object to which we have a unique relation.  
The range of possible relations philosophers have claimed we hold to our bodies is 
extreme, from identity to a contingent causal connection. 
Descartes famously argued that embodiment consisted of more than being 
ORGJHGLQRXUERGLHVOLNHDµSLORWLQKLVVKLS¶&60,,1 since we experience what 
happens to our bodies as sensations ± such as pleasure and pain ± rather than 
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intellectually, as observations of the physical world.  Here Descartes is emphasizing 
that our relation to our own bodies in unique, but all he says about the relation itself is 
WKDWµ,DPYHU\FORVHO\MRLQHGDQGDVLWZHUHLQWHUPLQJOHGZLWKLWVRWKDWI and the body 
IRUPDXQLW¶&60,,:KLOHLWLVKDUGHQRXJKWRZRUNRXWKRZ'HVFDUWHVFRXOG
DOORZWKHUHWREHDµXQLW¶± which must be more substantial than a mereological sum, 
for the pilot and his ship are parts of such a whole ±  composed of two distinct 
substances, such an account of embodiment is patently unavailable to an immaterialist.  
Despite a remarkable concern for the treatment of his corpse,2 Berkeley said almost 
nothing about embodiment.3 
While Descartes approached the issue of embodiment through consideration of 
sensation and imagination, it is more directly reached by consideration of action and 
agency.  Whenever we act upon the world, we act by moving our bodies.  In fact, we 
pretty much identify our body with that physical object which we can move directly; 
we regularly talk about instruments with which we have become particularly familiar 
DQG DGHSW DV µH[WHQVLRQV RI RXU ERGLHV¶ DQG SDWLHQWV ZLOO RIWHQ UHJDUG VXFFHVVIXO
prostheses as parts of their bodies.4 So if we can understand what an immaterialist such 
as Berkeley thinks about agency, we will have gone a fair way to understanding what 
he thinks about embodiment. 
, EHJLQE\GLVFXVVLQJD UHFHQW IOXUU\RI DUWLFOHVRQ WKH VXEMHFW RI%HUNHOH\¶V
account of action.  It is my view (Stoneham, 2010) that Berkeley was torn between two 
possible accounts of action, occasionalism and realism (the causal-volitional theory of 
action), and that each can be made consistent with his immaterialism, though each has 
its own costs.  It seems to me that Berkeley the anti-atheist would have been attracted 
by occasionalism and Berkeley the anti-sceptic by realism.5 In the absence of Part 2 of 
the Principles, we cannot know which would have won out.  So I choose to present 
Berkeley as a realist not because I think it is the uniquely correct interpretation of the 
texts, but because I find it more philosophically interesting as a version of 
immaterialism.6 In particular, it raises the possibility of a substantive account of human 
embodiment which is completely unavailable to the occasionalist.   
In §2 I articulate an apparent philosophical problem for Berkeley qua causal-
volitional theorist and show that Locke was aware of a related problem and had a 
solution of which Berkeley would have known.  In §3 I distinguish two interpretations 
RI %HUNHOH\¶V IDPRXV GHQLDO RI EOLQG DJHQF\ ± as the assertion of a weak 
representational condition or a strong epistemic one ± and provide evidence that there 
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was a well-established debate about blind powers in the 17th century which took the 
metaphor of blindness as indicating an epistemic rather than merely representational 
failing.  So at this point in the paper we have an account of agency which Berkeley 
would have known about and which imposes a condition upon the relation between 
volition and action which his contemporaries would likely have taken him to accept 
had he published his denial of blind agency.  What remains to do in §4 is to consider 
whether Berkeley, with his own peculiar commitments, could in fact accept this account 
of agency. 
 
1. Realism and Occasionalism 
 
Berkeley clearly says some things which look like unequivocal statements of causal-
volitional realism about action (e.g. NB 548, PHK 145-6, DHP1 196, DHP3 237, DM 
25).  But he also says many things which seem inconsistent with that view, primarily 
to the effect that God is responsible for all the motion in bodies (e.g. PHK 30, DHP2 
212-'02QWKHJURXQGVWKDWLWLVHVVHQWLDOWR%HUNHOH\¶VSKLORVRSK\WKDWKHFDQ
distinguish between sense-perception and imagination and that involuntariness both is 
a necessary condition for the former and a crucial premise in his argument for the 
existence of God, most commentators have attempted to render Berkeley consistent by 
reinterpreting the causal-volitional passages in ways which make them consistent with 
God being the cause of all we sense.7 
It has become a commonplace amongst early modernists that Berkeley rejects 
WKHUHDOLVWYLHZRIDFWLRQ)RUH[DPSOH0F'RQRXJKWHOOVXVµ%HUNHOH\KDGQRWUXFN
with mere conservatLRQLVP>LHUHDOLVP@ZLWKUHVSHFWWRILQLWHZLOOV¶ZKLOH
UHIHUULQJ XV WR %HUNHOH\¶V OHWWHU WR -RKQVRQ RI  1RYHPEHU  µHVSHFLDOO\
SDUDJUDSKVDQG¶8 But paragraph 2 of that letter contains one of the most unequivocal 
statements of the cRKHUHQFH RI UHDOLVP %HUNHOH\ SHQQHG µ1HLWKHU GRWK LW KLQGHU
admitting other causes besides God; such as spirits of different orders, which may be 
WHUPHG DFWLYH FDXVHV DV DFWLQJ LQGHHG WKRXJK E\ OLPLWHG DQG GHULYDWLYH SRZHUV¶9 
These powers are limited and derivative because these different orders of spirits are 
imperfect and created, but they are still real powers.  And paragraph 3 objects only to 
those who take the material world to have causal powers ± a view which was held by 
the pre-%HUNHOHLDQµPHUHFRQVHUYDWLRQLVWV¶EXWLVFOHDUO\RQHKHFDQWKRURXJKO\UHMHFW
without denying realism about the causal powers of finite spirits.   
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Now I do not want to deny that there is a coherent concurrentist interpretation 
of Berkeley, nor even that there is a coherent occasionalist interpretation, but rather I 
want to assert that there is also a coherent realist interpretation and that this has 
considerable philosophical merits.  If we take the realist option seriously, then it 
immediately becomes apparent that most oI 0F'RQRXJK¶V DUJXPHQWV DUH QRW IRU
concurrentism but against occasionalism, and thus can equally be wheeled out by the 
realist.  The real mistake is not to prefer one particular interpretation of Berkeley on 
DFWLRQEXWWRWKLQNWKDW%HUNHOH\¶VH[WDQWZRUks will provide a determinate answer to 
the question.  Perhaps if someone finds the missing manuscript of Principles Part 2 we 
will have a decisive text, but the very fact that no later works reconstruct that suggests 
Berkeley himself thought it inadequate. 
However, in what follows I shall largely set aside the possibility of a 
concurrentist interpretation of Berkeley.  It seems to me that such a position is 
inherently unstable, threatening to collapse into occasionalism or realism depending 
upon how we speOORXWWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHMRLQWDFWLRQ,IDV*RG¶VRPQLSRWHQFH
suggests, the human contribution is not necessary to the bringing about of the effect, 
then the position looks like a variation on occasionalism.  But equally, if it is sufficient, 
then we have a variant on realism.  So it must be somehow necessary but not sufficient 
LQDZD\ZKLFKGRHVQRWLPSXJQ*RG¶VRPQLSRWHQFH:HFDQDFKLHYHWKHIRUPHUE\
saying that it is nomologically necessary given how God has created the laws of nature, 
but then it is hard to see why it is not also nomologically sufficient, since the natural 
H[SODQDWLRQVRIP\VXFFHVVDQGIDLOXUHLQDFWLRQPDNHQRUHIHUHQFHWR*RG¶VSDUWLFXODU
FRQFXUUHQFHWDNLQJXVEDFNDJDLQWRUHDOLVP,IFRQFXUUHQWLVPZDV%HUNHOH\¶VVHWWled 
view, he ought to have told us how he would deal with this problem, and, given his 
personality, it is hard to imagine him either not noticing or not telling us.  Like so many 
of the more unusual interpretations of Berkeley, concurrentism faces the ± to my mind 
decisive ± objection: If that is what he thought he would have told us.10 
A defence of causal-volitional realism as a coherent position for Berkeley to 
hold would thus have to (a) show that the philosophical benefits of the view are at least 
as attractive as those of holding God causally responsible, with or without our 
concurrence, for all motions in the physical world, (b) show how Berkeley can account 
for the perception of our own actions, and (c) reinterpret the passages in which Berkeley 
seems to leave no space for finite spirits to be causally efficacious in the physical world.  
I have tackled the first two tasks before (Stoneham 2002, ch.6; 2010), arguing that only 
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the realist view gives adequate accounts of our knowledge of other minds and our moral 
responsibility. 
Sukjae Lee (2012) discusses the arguments from other minds and moral 
responsibility in some detail.11 With respect to the former, he never explains how the 
consequence for the occasionalist WKDWP\NQRZOHGJHRI*RG¶VH[LVWHQFHDVFDXVHLV
so different to my knowledge of the existence of other finite minds (by some sort of 
analogy, I suppose) sits with the pivotal argument of A IV.4 ff.  For it is crucial to the 
argument in Alciphron that wHNQRZ*RG¶VH[LVWHQFHLQWKHVDPHZD\ZHNQRZRIWKH
existence of other finite minds, since dialectically Alciphron is presented with a 
GLOHPPDHLWKHUDFFHSWZHKDYHUHDVRQWREHOLHYHLQ*RG¶VH[LVWHQFHRUGHQ\ZHKDYH
reason to believe in any other minds (Stoneham, 2013).With respect to the latter, Lee 
leaves the occasionalist Berkeley unable to draw a moral distinction between 
conspiracy (or intending to perform a wrong action) and the crime or sin itself.  This is 
EHFDXVH/HHIDOODFLRXVO\LQIHUVIURPµDOOJXLOWLVLQWKHZLOO¶WRµVLQIXOQHVVFRQVLVWVLQ
the willing RI WKH SK\VLFDO HYHQW DQG QRW WKH SK\VLFDO HYHQW LWVHOI¶  
overlooking the view that some physical events are sinful in virtue of the intentions of 
the agent.  Berkeley the clergyman was well aware that while willing murder, theft or 
fornication is a sin, actually committing would be a greater one.  After all, the general 
confession in the rite of Holy Communion in the Anglican Church, a service Berkeley 
would have been intimately familiar with, takes care to distinguish three ways of 
FRPPLWWLQJVLQµ%\WKRXJKWZRUGDQGGHHG¶12 
The crucial text for understanding the possibility of a realist interpretation of 
%HUNHOH\¶VDFFRXQWRIDFWLRQLV 
 
But though there be some things which convince us, human agents are 
concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one, that those things 
which are called the works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas 
or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on the wills 
of men. (PHK 146, my emphasis; v. also A. IV.5, quoted below) 
 
This passage seems to imply a division in the physical events between those 
which are the products of finite, created minds and those which are the products of the 
divine mind, the former being the works of man (and other finite spirits) and the latter 
the works of Nature.  That there is such a division in the physical events between things 
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that happen and things that we (finite creatures) do is part of the pre-philosophical 
understanding of the world, and it is a distinction that philosophers have fought hard to 
maintain in the face of the apparent ability of physics, or physiology, or 
neurophysiology, or some other branch of science, to subsume all the things we do into 
the class of things that merely happen.  It is not at all surprising that Berkeley should 
find himself attracted to such a view, for those who insist that ± despite appearances ± 
all the things we do are merely things that happen in the natural world, no different in 
their explanation than storms or sunsets, would be putting forward a view he would 
regard as sceptical.  As such, occasionalism about action would also look sceptical to 
Berkeley.13 
1RZDV3+.PDNHVFOHDUWKHUHVWULFWLRQRIµQDWXUH¶WRWKRVHSDUWVRI the 
SK\VLFDO ZRUOG QRW GLUHFWO\ XQGHU WKH FRQWURO RI ILQLWH PLQGV GRHVQ¶W WKUHDWHQ WKH
DUJXPHQWIRUWKHH[LVWHQFHRI*RGEHFDXVHQDWXUHPDNHVXSµE\IDUWKHJUHDWHVWSDUW¶
RI WKH SK\VLFDO ZRUOG VR WKH SURRIV RI *RG¶V H[LVWHQFH UHPDLQ DEXQGDQW DQG
unavoidable.  In fact, when articulating the argument in Alciphron, Berkeley makes 
clear that the inference to the existence of God is from those parts of nature not under 
the control of man: 
 
The soul of man actuates but a small body, an insignificant particle, in respect 
RI WKH JUHDW PDVVHV RI QDWXUH« 'RHV LW QRW IROORZ WKHQ WKDW IURP QDWXUDO
motions, LQGHSHQGHQWRIPDQ¶VZLOO, may be inferred both power and wisdom 
incomparably greater than that of the human soul? (A IV.5, my emphasis)   
 
By so doing, Berkeley leaves space for a proof of other finite minds with exactly 
the same structure as the proof of the existence of God but drawing upon different 
REVHUYHGGDWD 7KHSUREOHPWKLVPHWDSK\VLFDOSLFWXUHIDFHVKRZHYHU LV WKDW*RG¶V
creative intentions are meant to determine the regularity and order to be found in the 
physical world and yet there is a significant part of the physical world, namely the 
bodily movements which are basic actions of finite minds, which are ± assuming 
freewill (see A VII. 19-23) ± ouWVLGHRIWKHVFRSHRI*RG¶VGLUHFWFUHDWLYHDFW6LQFH
finite minds are imperfect and diverse, this threatens to undermine the admirable order 
and regularity of the physical world. 
There are a few things to note here: 
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1. The powers of finite minds are limited and there is no reason why 
they should not be limited in precisely the ways which will preserve 
the order and regularity of the natural world: I can move my hand 
into the path of a falling object, but whether I stop its fall or break 
my fingers depends upon the laws of nature.  This is, in part, what 
makes the difference between the action of a finite mind and the 
miraculous action of Christ. 
2. *RG¶V LQWHQWLRQVIRURUGHU LQ WKHQDWXUDOZRUOGFDQEHFRQGLWLRQDO
upon the volitions of finite minds: if I choose to let go of the book, 
it will fall, but if I choose not to, it will remain suspended.14 
3. Casual, or even quite careful, inspection of the natural world would 
lead one to believe that the order and regularity it has when left to 
its own devices is disrupted by the actions of humans and other 
creatures.  Of course, there is a clear sense in which we cannot defy 
gravity, but there is another in which we can: by holding the book I 
interfere with the natural regularity according to which it should fall.  
7RVHHVXFKµLQWHUYHQWLRQV¶DVWKHPVHOYHVPHUHO\H[SUHVVLRQVRIWKH
interaction of a series of complex laws is not an easy achievement. 
 
Now it seems a distinctive mark of modern metaphysics to accept that science itself 
gives us reason to think that the laws of nature are complete and universal with respect 
to the physical world, so the superficial appearance of finite spirits intervening in the 
operation of those laws is just that, a superficial appearance which will go away once 
we have a better understanding of the laws themselves.  This metaphysical picture was 
being constructed in the 17th century and began to be widely accepted in the 18th.  But 
it would be a mistake to read back into the early 18th century the universal acceptance 
of this metaphysics of science which only became such an article of faith in 20th century 
philosophy.  We should have an open mind with respect to the question of whether 
Berkeley accepted it.   
7KRXJK%HUNHOH\ZDVZULWLQJPRUHWKDQ\HDUVDIWHUWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI1HZWRQ¶V
Principia, there is the risk of anachronism in thinking that, had he rejected the 
universality and completeness of the laws of nature, he would have felt obliged to 
defend himself on that point.  De Motu gives us some examples of Berkeley confidently 
challenging Newton over the bucket thought-experiment and ± more significantly for 
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our purposes ± over the third law of motion (DM 70, see Stoneham 2002, 150-3 for 
discussion), and his concerns over infinitesimals are recurrent throughout his work.  But 
the really striking text is PHK 106, where he offers direct counter-examples to the 
universality of gravitational attraction: 
 
«ZHDUHDSWWR«KXPRXUWKat eagerness of mind, whereby it is carried to 
extend its knowledge into general theorems.  For example, gravitation, or 
mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway 
for pronouncing universal«:KHUHDVLWDSSHDUVWKHIL[HG stars have no such 
WHQGHQF\ WRZDUGV HDFK RWKHU DQG « LQ VRPH LQVWDQFHV D TXLWH FRQWUDU\
principle seems to shew itself: as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the 
elasticity of the air. 
 
Lee (2012, fn. 23) responds to this point by claiming that %HUNHOH\¶VFRQFHUQLQ
WKLVSDVVDJHLVRYHUZKHWKHUJUDYLWDWLRQDODWWUDFWLRQIROORZVIURPWKHµHVVHQWLDOQDWXUHV¶
of corporeal things.  Be that as it may, his method of arguing involves giving 
counterexamples to universality.  Of course, we know that the correct interpretation of 
Newton is that gravity is one force amongst others which acts upon bodies and we can 
thus explain the examples without granting an exception to the universality of 
gravitational attraction, but it seems that if Berkeley had understood that, he would have 
made his point very differently.  It certainly looks as if his target here is a certain version 
of Newtonian physics which holds gravitational attraction between every two bodies to 
be a universal law, whether or not it explains that by the essential natures of bodies.15  
A final problem recently raised for the coherence of the realist reading of 
Berkeley is an intriguing argument offered by John Russell Roberts (2010, 428).  
Roberts is considering the standard interpretation of PHK 28 which reads it as a clear 
statement that the realist casual-volitional theory is true of ideas of imagination (as 
ZRXOGDOVREHKHOGE\DQµDOPRVW-RFFDVLRQDOLVW¶SRVLWLRQOLNH/HH¶V± Roberts is, like 
everyone else in this debate, not taking realism about bodily actions seriously).  He 
objects that: 
 
It would mean that in imagining, we have something that is partly active in 
nature and partly passive.  It is odd that he would both draw attention to this 
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and not notice the trouble it creates for the very foundations of his metaphysics 
[viz. the absolute active/passive distinction].  (2010, 428) 
 
But WKLVMXVWPXGGOHVWKLQJVXSE\IRUJHWWLQJWKDWZKHQZHVD\WKDW%HUNHOH\¶V
ontology includes two fundamental types, namely minds and ideas, we are including 
ideas of imagination in the latter category.  Ideas of imagination are no more modes of 
minds than DUHLGHDVRIVHQVH:KHUH5REHUWV¶DUJXPHQWJRHVZURQJLVLQWKLQNLQJWKDW
there is any sense in which an idea of imagination is active: to be active an idea of 
imagination would have to be a cause, not an effect.  The mistake is encouraged by a 
sloppy way of talking in which we say ideas of sense are involuntary (excepting, 
perhaps, when we perceive our own actions) and ideas of imagination are voluntary.  
But ideas themselves are neither voluntary or involuntary, for those terms apply to 
events not objects, and this way of speaking is just shorthand for saying one type of 
idea is, and the other is not, caused by the volitions of the mind that perceives it ± after 
DOOP\LGHDVRIVHQVHDUHFDXVHGE\*RG¶VYROLWLRQVVRRQ5REHUWV¶YLHZWKH\ZRXOG
also be both voluntary and involuntary, both active and passive. 
7RXQGHUVWDQG%HUNHOH\¶VRQWRORJ\ZHKDYHWRUHPHPEHUWKDWLGHDVVWDQGLQ
two distinct relations to minds: perceptual and ontological.  Every idea is perceived by 
some mind and caused by some mind.  Ideas of sense (excepting, perhaps, when we 
perceive our own actions) are perceived by a finite mind and caused by a distinct mind, 
XVXDOO\*RG¶V,GHDVRILPDJLQDWLRQDUHSHUFHLYHGDQGFDXVHGE\WKHYHU\VDPHILQLWH
mind.  In causing (but not perceiving) ideas the mind is active.  Ideas do not cause 
anything, and there is no other form of activity, so all ideas, both of sense and 
imagination, are passive or inert.  All this is consistent with allowing finite minds to be 
the immediate causes of not only their ideas of imagination, but also of some ideas of 
sense. 
I conclude then that there is no fundamental obstacle to interpreting Berkeley 
as holding a realist causal-volitional theory of human action.  But to repeat myself, I do 
not make this as a claim about the actual opinions of the historical Berkeley, for I do 
not think he had any fixed opinions on the matter, and if he did, he did not write them 
down in any work that has survived.  Rather it is a coherent position for him to take and 
has significant philosophical benefits over occasionalism.  I now proceed to consider 
how that theory might account for the fact of human embodiment. 
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2. Volitions and Agency 
The simple volitional theory of agency is: S comes to have16 DZLVKGHVLUHRUµZLOOLQJ¶
towards the occurrence of some event A and that willing causes A to happen, thereby 
making A an intentional action of S.  But this just raises two further challenging 
questions: why does my willing my arm to rise cause my arm to rise rather than your 
arm to rise, and why does my willing to walk up the hill cause me to walk whereas my 
wishing I could fly has no effect?  These questions point to the fact that on this account 
of agency our relation to our bodies is entirely contingent.  It would seem as if the infant 
must learn how to act on the world by willing things and watching to see what effects 
if any those willings have, then repeating the willings to bring about the now predicted 
effect.  This is absurd, since it makes trying to move our own bodies just like trying to 
move a pencil by telekinesis (though rather more successful) and as such seriously 
misrepresents the nature of our embodiment. Suppose I had the power of telekinesis, 
the power to move objects just by willing them to move. Then I would have two distinct 
ways of moving my arm: the normal way of moving it and the telekinetic way of 
moving it by willing and that willing causing it to move. If we only had the latter, we 
would have a very different relation to the world and our bodies than we appear to have. 
The problem with the simple volitional theory seems to be that if I will or even 
intend that something happens, such as the pencil moves, then the connection between 
the willing and the happening is definitely contingent.  But we can and do distinguish 
between someone who wills or wishes something to happen and someone who forms 
the volition, that is intends, to do something.  There is a difference between intending 
that the pencil should move ± perhaps by the effect of gravity or wind ± and intending 
to move the pencil. Only the latter is constitutive of genuine intention to act.  
Consequently, a being which willed certain things only to find that they happened 
would never be able to regard any worldly event as a basic action of hers, as something 
she just does rather than something she does by doing something else, for every effect 
she had on the world would be something she did by doing something else, namely 
willing.  
If all action were like telekinesis, like the contingent effect of a willing, 
disembodiment would be the breaking of a contingent relation; it would not be a matter 
of losing certain abilities, but merely being placed in a less favourable relation to the 
physical world, like someone who cannot reach the top shelf in the library.  In contrast, 
someone who intends to do something, when they are successful, does not bring that 
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about by willing, but simply brings it about as they willed.  It is precisely because of 
this, rather than the lack of causal connection, that we think an occasionalist account of 
action in fact leaves us impotent, for the intention to do something, rather than merely 
WKDWVRPHWKLQJKDSSHQVLVQHYHUIXOILOOHGKRZHYHUUHOLDEOHDQRFFDVLRQRI*RG¶VDFWLRQ
our willings are, nothing happens as willed but merely consequent upon willing.  In the 
case of genuine agency, the connection between the intention and the basic action is 
not contingent in the same way: whatever is the relation between my intention and my 
arm rising when I raise my arm intentionally (and it is at least causal), that is not a 
relation which can hold between that intention and a different event, an event which is 
not17 a raising of my arm by me.  My intention to raise my arm might have all sorts of 
effects, but only one of those effects can ever be something I do directly, an expression 
of my agency. 
What seems problematic about the account of human action as a matter of 
forming a volition to do A and that volition reliably causing A to happen is that it 
collapses into the view that doing A is a matter of forming the volition that A should 
happen and that volition causing A to happen, which we have seen is an inadequate 
account of our agency.  For if doing A consists in forming a volition which causes A to 
happen, then the content of the volition to do A, is the same as the volition that A happen 
as a result of a volition, that is, that one does A by forming the volition.  (Woozley 
1985) While it might have seemed that strengthening the relation from occasioning to 
causing would have helped, the fundamental problem remains. 
This is often taken to be an entirely general objection to any volitional theory 
of action deriving from the fact that it gives an inadequate account of the role of the 
body in human agency, for it is assumed by critics that the only relation a volitional 
theory can allow between volition/intention and its bodily effect is causal and thus 
incapable of sustaining a unique relation to our bodies.  Setting aside the question of 
what Berkeley took the nature of the causal relation between volition and effect to be 
(see Stoneham 2002, 147-53 for an initial discussion of the matter), it is open to the 
proponent of such a theory to place other constraints upon the relation between volition 
and action, so the volition to do A does not reduce to the volition that A should happen 
as a result of my willing. 
If the volition to do A is reducible to the volition that A should happen as a 
result of my willing, then it would seem that there are no constraints upon what one 
could form a volition to do.  However, it seems that there are such constraints18 and 
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Berkeley himself would have been familiar with this point, for it crops up briefly in 
Locke's Essay: 
 
Such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal Actions 
by sounds, that I must here warn my Reader that Ordering, Directing, Chusing, 
Preferring, etc. which I have made use of, will not distinctly enough express 
Volition, unless he will reflect on what he himself does, when he wills. For 
Example, Preferring which seems perhaps best to express the Act of Volition, 
does it not precisely. For though a Man would preferr flying to walking, yet 
who can say he ever wills it? (E 2.21.15, emphasis original) 
 
Locke has noted the difference between merely wanting something to happen 
and forming a volition to do it.  The final sentence draws attention to an apparent 
restriction on what we form volitions to do, noting that however much we may want to 
fly, none of us will it.  Why?  The obvious explanation is that flying is just not within 
our repertoire as human beings.19 Now it is unlikely that Berkeley, a keen student of 
Locke's Essay, would have been unaware of this point.  The question is whether he can 
account for it, and if he holds the simple volitional theory that to act is to form a volition 
which causes a bodily motion, then it seems he cannot.  Unfortunately, Berkeley 
appears to have nothing more to say about what it is to be an agent than that it is to have 
volitions which are effective, and in so doing ignores the difference between a willing 
that one flies which somehow causes one to fly, and a genuine volition to fly.  
Furthermore, the conception of ourselves as agents which best explains the facts about 
what we can and cannot form a volition to do, which answers the question of how we 
act, is a conception of ourselves as being agents in virtue of our embodiment (and 
having the specific kind of body we do).  It is hard to see how the Berkeleian can make 
embodiment essential to agency in this manner, since it is spirits and not human beings 
who are agents.  It seems that our agency is essential to us but our embodiment merely 
contingent. 
Locke answered his own question very briefly: 
 
Volition, µWLs plain, is an Act of the Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it 
takes it self to have over any part of the Man, by employing it in, or withholding 
it from any particular Action. (E 2.21.15, emphasis original) 
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What Locke seems to be saying here is that we cannot form the volition to fly 
up the hill rather than walk because we cannot knowingly exert the power to fly.  In that 
case, we fail the epistemic condition because we know we cannot fly, and thus do not 
µWDNHRXUVHOYHV¶WRKDYHWKHSRZHUWRGRVR%XWZKDWRIFDVHVZKHUHZHHUURQHRXVO\
take ourselves to have a power?  Can we form a volition then?  It seems to me that this 
very much depends upon the grounds for our error.  Consider a retired athlete who 
thinks she can still perform a feat of her youth.  Here the belief she has the power may 
or may not be reasonable, depending upon her health, fitness etc., and that in turn 
matters to whether she can form the volition, for if she knows she is ill or unfit or 
arthritic, then her belief that she still has the power will be unreasonable and it seems 
VKHFDQQRWµNQRZLQJO\¶H[HUWWKDWSRZHU6LPLODUO\LPDJLQHDFKLOGZKRKDVVHHQD
gymnast perform a standing back-flip and wants to do one as well.  She may take herself 
to have that ability, and if strong and agile enough, she may even have it and be able to 
SHUIRUPWKHIOLSZLWKDOLWWOHGLUHFWLRQEXWVKHFDQQRWµNQRZLQJO\H[HUW¶WKDWDELOLW\LI
her belief that she has the ability is unreasonable.  Reasonableness here is going to 
depend upon her background beliefs and whether they support the thought that a back-
flip is something anyone, or even most people, can do (e.g. a forward roll) or whether 
it is a special skill.  At this stage, whether her belief that she has the ability is 
unreasonable or not may be a little vague, and thus it may be unclear whether she is 
really forming a volition, but once she has been shown how to do it by a coach, or 
perhaps just told by the same reliable source that she can do it if she tries correctly, then 
the belief is reasonable.  The epistemic condition seems to require that we are not 
unreasonable in what powers we take ourselves to possess, though it may not go so far 
as to require that we in fact have good positive grounds for the belief.20 
,IWKLVOLQHRIWKRXJKWLVULJKWWKHQZHVKRXOGXQSDFN/RFNH¶VSRLQWDVH[SUHVVLQJ
the following necessary conditions upon successful action: 
 
(1) The mind has dominion, i.e. has power over, some parts of the body. 
(2) The mind not unreasonably does take itself to have this power. 
(3) In forming a volition, the mind exerts this power knowing that it does so. 
 
Behaviours which are not actions fall into different categories.  When we wish we 
could fly up the steep hill, we simply do not form a volition and any subsequent arm-
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flapping is not even an attempt to fly.  But we may also fail condition (3) by forming a 
volition to do X which brings about Y: in such a case Y is not an intentional action 
because, though caused by a volition, the mind is not knowingly exerting its power to 
do Y.  There are also a range of cases where we try but fail to do something.  If trying 
to do something entails having the volition to do it,21 these are cases where the volition 
is formed so the epistemic condition is met.  These can be cases where the agent 
reasonably but incorrectly believes herself to have the power, or where she has the 
power and exerts it but the context prevents the outcome.  The boundaries between all 
these situations need not be sharp. 
Thus Locke holds a version of the volitional theory of action according to which 
the mind, in acting, succeeds in bringing about an effect it intends to bring about and it 
knows, or at least not unreasonably believes, it has the power to do so.  He retains the 
structure of the volitional theory, the division into volition and its effect, but places a 
constraint upon forming a volition which ensures that the relation between the two is 
not merely contingent: if you form the volition to do A, you must meet an epistemic 
condition with respect to your power to do it.  If we assume that reasons for belief raise 
the probability of its truth, then that epistemic condition ensures that the connection 
between the volition and its effects is not merely arbitrary: in forming the volition to 
raise my arm, I must meet a condition which raises the probability of my arm rising but 
does not raise the probability of your arm rising or my leg moving.  And since in most 
normal cases we know we have the powers we exert, then this connection is very tight. 
This also addresses the problem of basic actions being a matter of doing 
something as willed rather than by willing.  For if we form the volition to do something, 
DQGGRLQJLWFRQVLVWVQRWPHUHO\LQFDXVLQJLWWRKDSSHQEXWNQRZLQJO\H[HUWLQJRQH¶V
GRPLQLRQRYHURQH¶VERG\WKHQZKHQ,LQWHQGWRPRYHP\DUP,GRQRWLQWHQGWKDWP\
arm move as a result of my volition, that I move it by willing, but rather that I move it 
simpliciter, for that is part of my dominion over my body. 
Returning to the initial question of our embodiment, it seems that the Lockean 
epistemic condition upon volition gives us at least part of an answer to the question of 
what is so special about our own bodies, namely that our bodies are those physical 
objects we know (or at least reasonably believe) ourselves to have (direct) dominion 
RYHU7KLVLVDSODXVLEOHVXIILFLHQWFRQGLWLRQIRUDSDUWRIWKHSK\VLFDOZRUOGWRµEHORQJ¶
(Descartes, CSM II 52) to me, at least if we accept that prostheses can literally become 
SDUWRIRQH¶VERdy.  But it is not a necessary condition because of those parts of my 
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body, such as the heart and liver, over which I exercise no power of agency.  It is, 
significantly, a sufficient condition which an immaterialist could accept.   
 
3. Blind Agents 
That an immaterialist could impose an epistemic condition upon forming a volition and 
thus give an account of embodiment tells us nothing about what Berkeley might have 
WKRXJKW :KDW,SURSRVHWRDUJXHLVWKDW%HUNHOH\¶VIDPRXVGHQLDORIµEOLQGDJHQWV¶
should be interpreted as imposing an epistemic condition upon agency.  The phrase 
µEOLQGDJHQW¶LVPHWDSKRULFDODQGLWLVXQFOHDUZKDWLWVGHQLDODPRXQWVWRSUHFLVHO\,Q
this section I shall argue that there was a long intellectual tradition in the 17th century 
in which blindness is used as a metaphor for an epistemic failing, so we can read 
%HUNHOH\¶VGHQLDORIEOLQGDJHQF\DVWKHGHQLDOWKDWWKHUHFRXOGEHDJHQWVwho lacked 
knowledge of something. 
.HQQHWK:LQNOHU¶V MXVWO\ LQIOXHQWLDOGLVFXVVLRQ-16) of %HUNHOH\¶V
denial of blind agency pays almost no attention to physical actions.  His objectives in 
that discussion are to show that (i) the denial of blind agency is something Berkeley 
might have taken to be uncontroversial given that it was widely and uncritically 
accepted by Descartes, Malebranche and Locke, and (ii) the denial helps us understand 
some passages in the major works, thus (iii) we can attribute the denial to Berkeley in 
his published works.  Given that what Winkler wants to establish with this attribution 
LV WKDW WKH LGHDV RI XQSHUFHLYHG REMHFWV DUH LQ *RG¶V PLQG LQ YLUWXH RI KLV
intentions/volitions to create perceptions in us, he only needs to establish that Berkeley 
holds a weak, representational thesis: agents must have an idea of that which they intend 
or will.  However, it is entirely consistent with all the arguments Winkler gives that 
Berkeley held the stronger, epistemic thesis: agents must have knowledge that they are 
able to do that which they form a volition to do. 
Berkeley only uVHVWKHSKUDVHµEOLQGDJHQW¶WZLFHRQFHLQWKH1RWHERRNVDQG
once in Siris:22 
 
[God] is no Blind agent & in truth a blind Agent is a Contradiction. (NB 812) 
 
Nor will it suffice from present phenomena and effects, through a chain of 
natural causes and subordinate blind agents, to trace a divine Intellect as the 
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remote original cause, that first created the world, and then set it a-going. (S 
237)21 
 
The occurrence in the Notebooks FRPHVQRWORQJDIWHUKLVUHIHUHQFHWR/RFNH¶V
correspondence with Limborch (NB 743) in which Locke also uses the phrase, 
suggesting where Berkeley came across it.  For in fact, that precise expression is 
surprisingly rare in the 17th FHQWXU\1RQHRI:LQNOHU¶VTXRWDWLRQVIURP'HVFDUWHVRU
Malebranche23 use precisely that expression and a search of Early English Books 
2QOLQHSURGXFHVRQO\RQHRFFXUUHQFHLQDWUHDWLVHE\(GZDUG5H\QROGVµRIWKH
passions and faculties of tKHVRXORIPDQ¶ZKHUHLWDSSHDUVWZLFHLQ&KDSWHU;;;,RQ
the causes of anger.  Reynolds was a high profile Bishop of Norwich and a prolific 
author.  He had been Dean of Christ Church until March 1651, just 14 months before 
/RFNH¶VHOHFWLRQWRDStudentship.  According to the DNB (Atherton, 2004), his Treatise 
of the Passions µZDVVWLOODFRPPRQXQGHUJUDGXDWHWH[WDW2[IRUGDWWKHHQGRIWKHth 
cenWXU\¶\HDUVDIWHUKLVGHDWK 
 
Now nothing doth more aggravate a wrong than this, that it proceeded from 
the will of man. And the reasons are, First, because a mans Power is in his 
Will[,] but Passions and other blind Agents, when they work ungoverned, are 
our Imperfections, and not our Power; and therefore the easier borne withall. 
(1640, 311-310 [N.B. the page numbering in this chapter contains many 
errors]) 
 
8 Give Injuries a New Name, and that will worke a new Affection. In blinde 
Agents call it Chance· in weake Persons, Infirmity, In simple, Ignorance, in 
wise Counsell, in Superiours, Discipline, In equals, Familiarity, in Inferiors, 
Confidence, where there is no other construction to be made, doe as Ioseph and 
David did, call it Providence, and see what God sayes to thee by it. (1640, 322-
3) 
 
It seems that Reynolds is using the phrase as a stylistic varianWIRUµEOLQGSRZHUV¶
(caeca potentia) which was a much more common term of art and one he used 
elsewhere.  In both these passages, Reynolds is concerned with attributions of 
responsibility and blindness in a cause is taken to exculpate.  He does not regard the 
:LOODVEOLQG VXSSRUWLQJ:LQNOHU¶VDUJXPHQW WKDW WKHGHQLDORIEOLQGDJHQF\ZDVD
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FRPPRQSODFHDQGUHJDUGVWKHEOLQGDJHQWVRUSRZHUVDVEHLQJµXQJRYHUQHG¶LQWKHLU
effects, even to the point of randomness.  And it is quite clear that the crucial deficiency 
in a blind power for Reynolds is ignorance: 
 
Now, since all appetite (being a blind Power) is dependant upon the direction 
of some Knowledge; from the diversitie of Knowledge in, or annexed unto 
things, may be gathered the prime distinction of Passions. (1640, 32) 
 
And in a striking passage where he uses actual blindness as an illustration, it is 
the fact that the blind man does not know where to walk which is significant for 
Reynolds: 
 
Or, as if a blind man, who hath not the power of directing his owne feet, should 
be permitted to run headlong, without wit or moderation, having no Guide to 
direct him. (1640, 45) 
 
Reynolds is not alone in regarding the deficiency of a blind power as a random 
and chaotic force which lacks knowledge. For example, in HeQU\0RUH¶VThe 
Immortality of the Soul we find the lack of chaos in nature being taken to be evidence 
that its cause is not blind but wise: 
 
The evidence of Externall Objects of Sense, that is, the ordinary Phaenomena 
of Nature, in which there is discoverable so profound Wisdome and Counsell, 
that they could not but conclude that the order of things in the world was from 
a higher Principle than the blind motions and jumblings of Matter and meer 
Corporeall Beings. (1659, 66)24 
 
Can a blind impetus produce such effects, with that accuracy and constancy, 
that, the more wise a man is, the more he will be assured That no Wisdome can 
adde, take away, or alter any thing in the works of Nature, whereby they may 
be bettered? (1659, 81) 
 
Other references which support the connection between blindness in a power or 
force and an epistemic deficiency (in most cases the alleged blindness of the will is 
equated with its not knowing what is good or desirable, though presumably it is directed 
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on some end, and is thus intentional) include: 
 
Richard Allestree, )RUW\VHUPRQV«SUHDFK
GEHIRUHWKH.LQJDQGRQVROHPQ
occasions, 1684, p.262 
Anthony Burgess, A treatise of original sin, 1658, p.197 
Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus linguae Romanae & Britannicae, 1578, def. 
Caecus casus 
Nathanael Culverwel, An elegant and learned discourse of the light of nature, 
1652, p.118, 155 
John Dryden, Notes and observations on The empress of Morocco, 1674, p.39 
John Flavel, Pneumatologia, a treatise of the soul of man, 1685, p.397 
A Gentleman in communion with the Church of England, Sober, and serious 
considerations occasioned by the death of His Most Sacred Majesty, King 
Charles II (of ever blessed memory), 1685, p.35 
J. A., of Ailward, An historicall narration of the iudgement of some most 
learned and godly English bishops, holy martyrs, and others, 1631, p.24 
Thomas Manton, One hundred and ninety sermons on the hundred and 
nineteenth Psalm, 1681, p.873 
John Northleigh, Exercitationes philologicae, 1681, Preface 
Edward Polhill, The divine will considered in its eternal decrees, and holy 
execution of them, 1695, p.442 
Edward Reynolds, Israels prayer in time of trouble with Gods gracious answer 
thereunto, 1649, p.20 
John Sadler, Masquarade du ciel presented to the great Queene of the little 
vvorld. 1640, p.35 
John Wallis, Truth tried, 1643, p.43 
 
And when we turn from the general intellectual culture of the 17th FHQWXU\WR/RFNH¶V
use of the term, it is far from clear that he was only imposing a weak, representational 
condition when he denied blind agents.  Consider the passage where he uses the phrase 
µ$JHQWHPFDHFXP¶ZKLFK:LQNOHUTXRWHVDQG%HUNHOH\UHIHUVWRDWNB 743: 
 
If you say that the judgement of the understanding, or cogitation, is not one of 
the 'requisites for acting'. Please consider whether, while you want in this way 
to make a man free, you are not simply making him a blind agent; and whether, 
in order to make him free, you are not taking away from him understanding, 
without which any sort of Liberty cannot exist or be supposed to exist. For 
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liberty does not belong in any way whatsoever to things destitute of cogitation 
and understanding. (1976: 408) 
 
Here the implausible consequence of blind agency is an objection to a view 
ZKLFK GHQLHV QRW PHUHO\ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ EXW µMXGJHPHQW¶ RU sive µFRJLWDWLRQ¶ DV
conditions on agency.  And when Berkeley discusses this, the phrase he quotes is 
µ-XGLFLXP,QWHOOHFWXV¶  ,WVHHPVWKHQWKDW WKHUHZDVDORQJWUDGLWLon of the denial of 
blind agency being equivalent to the assertion of an epistemic condition upon agency, 
and Berkeley had come across it, at least in Locke if not in others. 
It is also worth commenting briefly on the distinction in Reynolds between the 
blind appetites and the knowing will.  This was a familiar contrast in an established 
debate at the time, but the important point for our purposes is that these blind appetites 
are the motivational forces behind such habitual sins as lust, gluttony and sloth.  Now 
it would seem very strange to think that such appetites do not represent their objects, 
that he who lusts does not have an idea of she for whom he lusts.  It seems then that 
blindness in appetites might be consistent with meeting the weak representational 
condition on agency. 
 
4. Immaterial Agents 
6R%HUNHOH\¶VGHQLDORIEOLQGDJHQF\FDQLQLWVKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[WEHWDNHQWREHDQ
assertion of an epistemic condition upon agents: in order to do X, one must form the 
volition to do X, and in order to form the volition to do it, one must know how to do 
X,25 that is, one must know that one has the power to do it just by trying. 
It remains to be shown that this interpretation is consistent with what Berkeley 
does say about agency, which is very little, and with what he says about knowledge, 
which is rather more. Clearly the required knowledge is sometimes based on 
experience.  Consider a child learning to catch a ball: the progress from total failure, to 
occasional lucky successes, to regular achievement, to confident control.  At the end of 
WKH SURFHVV DV VRPHRQH FDOOV µ&DWFK¶ DQG KXUOV D EDOO LQ KHU GLUHFWLRQ VKH NQRZV
whether she can catch it (not whether she will, since mistakes are always possible, 
reminding us again of the near factive character of intentions), and that knowledge is 
clearly based on experience.  Now, if all knowledge of what we can and cannot do could 
be shown to be based on experience, then the Berkeleian would be able to consistently 
assert the epistemic condition.  It might be surprising to discover that the mewling 
 20 
infant only knows how to suckle or cry from experience, but no more surprising than 
%HUNHOH\¶VFODLPWKDWWKHLQIant can only see that her mother is close or far on the basis 
of experienced correlations of the ideas of sight and touch.   
Unfortunately Berkeley faces a dangerous regress.  The child can learn to catch 
because she already knows she can move her hands into those positions and track a 
moving object with her eyes.  What she learns is how to coordinate actions she can 
already perform.  Similarly for playing the piano and riding a bike.  So we need to ask 
how she knows she can perform those more basic actions.  And if that knowledge is 
only acquired from experience because there are yet other actions she can perform, the 
regress is started. 
Tracing back the regress from our complex mature actions would be a difficult 
and tedious matter, but we can easily spot a starting point and ask our question about 
that.  Seconds after birth, perhaps in response to the actions of the midwife, a new born 
child utters her first cry.  Is that blind agency or does she know she can do it?  And if 
she knows, how does she know?  
The attractive answer is to say that the first cry and those which soon follow it, 
like many other behaviours of the neonate, are not intentional actions.  Once the child 
learns she can make that noise, and especially once she learns its effect on her mother, 
then she may make it intentionally.  Similarly for limb movements and eye-tracking 
and other things the neonate achieves.  There is no blind agency, intentional action does 
require knowledge, which requires experience and thus children gradually gain 
intentional control of their behaviours as they acquire experience of what they can 
achieve. 
8QIRUWXQDWHO\%HUNHOH\FDQQRWDFFHSWWKLVDQVZHU&RQVLGHUWKHQHRQDWH¶VILUVW
cry.  Did she cause that or not?  If she did not cause it, it is unclear how her experience 
of the cry could teach her that she has the power to cry and thus ground later intentional 
crying.  But if she did cause it while not meeting the epistemic condition upon volition, 
then she caused something without willing it, without a volition, and Berkeley explicitly 
denies that: 
 
This making and unmaking of ideas very properly denominates the mind 
active.  Thus much is certain, and grounded on experience: but when we talk 
of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse 
our selves with words. (PHK 28, v. also NB 699)26 
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That only minds are active and that their activity requires volitions is a 
fundamental part of Berkeleian idealism and not one to be given up lightly. 
What seems to have gone wrong is that Berkeley has failed to spot an ambiguity 
LQWKHWHUPµDJHQW¶RQWKHRQHKDQGDQDJHQWDVLQµDJHQWRIFKDQJH¶LVDFDXVHEXt 
on the other, an agent is one who performs an intentional action.  So it is possible for 
Berkeley to say that nothing is an agent in the first sense except in so far as the change 
is a result of its µPHQWDORSHUDWLRQV¶, preserving the thesis that only minds are active, 
but that a further condition must be met for agency in the second sense, namely that the 
subject must know she can achieve what she wills.  For example, imagine standing in 
front of a mirror trying to wiggle your ears.  For a long while nothing happens, then 
they wiggle, but when you try again, they do not.  We have no difficulty with the idea 
that the wiggle was caused by your trying ± a mental operation, but we do not, in such 
a case, think that the wiggle was an intentional action, for you still do not know how to 
wiggle your earsLWLVQRWVRPHWKLQJ\RXFDQGRµDWZLOO¶HYHQLI\RXUWU\LQJWRGRLW
occasionally causes it to happen. Similarly, if someone tries to move a pencil 
telekinetically and to their surprise it moves, they may be the cause of its motion but 
they did not move it in the same sense as had they picked it up.  And returning to our 
neonate, the first cry is a mere reaction, caused by her mental act but not itself an act of 
hers, and on observing these cries, the child may try to bring one about on demand and 
finds she can with ease.  Learning she can so cause a cry by trying, she discovers it is 
in her power and comes to cry intentionally. 
It seems that this distinction between minds as causes and as agents of 
intentional aFWLRQVPD\EHUHTXLUHGE\%HUNHOH\¶VDFFRXQWRIVXJJHVWLRQLQ179DQG
elsewhere.  For suggested ideas are not caused by God, otherwise we would not need 
to learn the visual language from experience of the relation between sign and signified. 
So they must come from us, and are a result of our mental operations, namely learning 
the signification of certain combinations of ideas.  But, and this is an important contrast 
between suggestion and inference, when an idea is suggested, it is not voluntary, that 
is, itVFRPLQJWRPLQGLVQRWDQLQWHQWLRQDODFWLRQRIPLQH6RSHUKDSV%HUNHOH\¶VGHQLDO
of the exciting of ideas exclusive of volition actually overstates the case.27 
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Concluding Remarks 
This paper has been a move in that enticing game of guessing the contents of the 
Principles of Human Knowledge Part 2.  As many have said before, there is reason to 
suspect that part of the reason the lost manuscript was never re-written was that 
Berkeley saw some problems he could not solve.  I have been arguing that the problem 
of giving an adequate account of agency and embodiment is solvable, but at a cost, 
namely he would have had to accept that finite minds can be causes without being 
intentional agents, so that they can acquire the knowledge necessary to become such 
DJHQWV,VWKDWWRRKLJKDSULFHWRSD\",WGHSHQGVZKHWKHU%HUNHOH\¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR
volitional causation is primarily a rejection of non-mental causes, or whether it is rooted 
in a rejeFWLRQRIDOOIRUPVRIµEOLQGSRZHU¶,IWKHGHQLDORIEOLQGDJHQF\JLYHV%HUNHOH\
an account of human embodiment, then the denial that God is a blind agent gives a 
IXUWKHUUHDVRQWRWKLQNWKDWµLQKLPZHOLYHDQGPRYHDQGKDYHRXUEHLQJ¶VKRXOGEH
taken lLWHUDOO\*RG¶VUHODWLRQWRQDWXUHLVWKHVDPHDV± or very similar to ± our relation 
to our bodies. 
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Notes 
 
1. 6HHµ$EEUHYLDWLRQV¶IRUUHIHUHQFHVWR'HVFDUWHV/RFNHDQG%HUNHOH\ 
2. µ,WHPWKDWP\%RG\Eefore it is buried, be kept five days above ground, or 
longer, even till it grow offensive by the cadaverous smell, and that during 
the said time it lye unwashed, undisturbed, and covered by the same bed 
FORWKHVLQWKHVDPHEHGWKHKHDGEHLQJUDLVHGXSRQSLOORZV¶/DVW:Lll and 
Testament, Jessop & Luce, VII, 381) 
3. The epigraph to this paper comes from the following passage: 
 
We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with 
corporeal motions. By the Law of our Nature we are affected upon every alteration 
in the nervous parts of our sensible body: which sensible body rightly considered, 
is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas, as have no existence distinct 
from being perceived by a mind: so that this connexion of sensations with corporeal 
motions, means no more than a correspondence in the order of Nature between two 
sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But God is a pure spirit, 
disengaged from all such sympathy or natural ties. No corporeal motions are 
attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in his mind. (DHP3 241) 
 
The point of this passage is to draw attention to our embodiment and use it 
to explain why we feel pain and God does not.  
4. In the preamble to Siris, Berkeley describes the relation between mind and 
body as analogous to that between a musician and his instrument.  While 
the purpose of this is to recommend looking after the health of the body as 
well as the mind, it implies a particularly close relation between mind and 
body, for a musician with no instrument makes no music (Jessop & Luce, 
V, 31). 
5. Berkeley would not be alone in thinking the denial of action realism to be 
VFHSWLFDOHJ&DWKHULQH7URWWHUZULWHVµ'R\RXXQGHUVWDQGhow 
\RXUVRXO«PRYHV\RXUERG\RULVDIIHFWHGE\LW"7KHVHDUHoperations, 
ZKLFK,VXSSRVH\RXDUHQRWVRVFHSWLFDODVWRGHQ\¶ 
6. Few others have defended realism, the notable exception being Fleming 
(2006).  The best defence of almost-occasionalist interpretations is Lee 
(2012), though the view that for Berkeley volition is our only action can be 
traced back to Hornsby (1980, 52). There is a third option, called 
µFRQFXUUHQWLVP¶DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKRXUERGLO\PRWLRQVDUHWKHMRLQWXSVKRW
RIERWKRXUYROLWLRQVDQG*RG¶V$VIDUDV,NQRZWKLVZDVILUVWVXJJHVWHG
by Dancy (1998, 56) and defended in McDonough (2008).  Roberts (2010) 
gives a different account in terms of immanent causation, but for present 
purposes that will stand or fall with occasionalism. 
7. Oddly, few note that the problem only arises if we can perceive our own 
actions (Stoneham 2002, 192-99). 
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8. The other passages McDonough cites only show that Berkeley was aware 
of concurrentism and rejected it as a possible account of material causation, 
MXVWDVKHUHMHFWHGPHUHFRQVHUYDWLRQLVPIRUPDWHULDOFDXVHV7KHµVWrange 
LPSRWHQFHRIPHQ¶SDVVDJHLQWKHQRWHERRNV1%LVKDUGWRUHFRQFLOH
ZLWK UHDOLVP EXW ZH VKRXOG QRWH WKDW LW KDV WKH P\VWHULRXV µ¶ VLJQ DQG
comes very early in the notebooks, crucially before the consideration of the 
rejected bundle view (NB 580), so I am not inclined to place much weight 
on it. 
9. 7KLV LV FOHDUO\ D SDUDSKUDVH RI '+3  µWKH XVH RI OLPLWHG SRZHUV
ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of 
WKHLURZQZLOOV¶ 
10. ,W LV DOVR VWULNLQJ WKDW 0F'RQRXJK¶V FRQtextualist argument for 
concurrentism being a live option to Berkeley concentrates on the 16th 
century scholastic tradition.  If this genuinely was a live option in 1710, then 
we would expect (a) to find other concurrentists, and (b) to have some 
readers of Berkeley notice this.  It is worth noting that we do find 
contemporary occasionalists and plenty of readers of Berkeley who take him 
to be a closet Malebranchian (and we also find other contemporary 
immaterialist occasionalists, e.g. Collier). 
11. Lee notes that he is responding to an anonymous referee, whose identity 
should now be obvious to the attentive reader. 
12. Roberts appears to deny this (2010, 426), but his theology seems more suited 
to dissenters than orthodox Anglicans. 
13. &I0ROLQD¶VUHPDUNRQoccasionalism, quoted by McDonough (2008, n.16), 
KLPVHOI GUDZLQJ IURP )UHGGRVR µHYHU\RQH UHMHFWV WKLV SRVLWLRQ DQG 6W
Thomas justifiably calls it stupid. For what could be more stupid than to 
GHQ\ZKDWLVREYLRXVIURPH[SHULHQFHDQGVHQVHSHUFHSWLRQ"¶ 
14. BHUNHOH\H[SOLFLWO\HQGRUVHVWKH0ROLQLVWSRVLWLRQWKDW*RG¶VLQWHQWLRQVIRU
the physical world are conditional upon our (free) actions in PHK 44. 
15. :RRGEULGJHLVDQLQWHUHVWLQJVWXG\RI%HUNHOH\¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWK
the Newtonian conception of laws. Thanks to John Blechl for this source. 
16. ,VWKLVIRUPLQJRIDµYROLWLRQ¶LWVHOIDQLQWHQWLRQDODFWLRQ":HVKDOOVHHWKDW
on this simple account it must be, because we move our bodies by willing. 
On the modified account below, it does not have to be.  Would it still be 
objectionable to still think of it as an action? So long as it is not an action 
by which we move our bodies, I do not see a problem here, for we can say 
that in intentionally moving my legs, I do two things, I form the intention 
and I move them.  ,FDQ¶WGRWKHODWWHUZLWKRXWWKHIRUPHUEXW,PD\ZHOOGR
the former without the latter.   
17. «LGHQWLFDOWRRUSDUWRIRUDQHFHVVDU\FRQVHTXHQFHRI« 
18. 7KLVLVZKDW$QQHWWH%DLHUFDOOVWKHµQHDUIDFWLYH¶FKDUDFWHURI
intentions. The qualificatioQ µQHDU¶ UHPLQGV XV WKDW WKHUH FDQ EH LQWHUQDO
relations which are weaker than logical necessity. If the relation between a 
volition and its effect is that kind of internal relation (Stoneham 2002, 148-
9), then pace Kendrick (2014, 11) there is a third option for the volitional 
WKHRU\EHWZHHQµEOLQGFKDQFH¶DQGµIDWDOQHFHVVLW\¶3+. 
19. $W/RFNHLPDJLQHVµD0DQIDOOLQJLQWRWKH:DWHUD%ULGJHEUHDNLQJ
XQGHUKLP¶DQGQRWHVWKDWµWKRXJKKHKDV9ROLWLRQWKRXJKKHSUHIHUVKLV
not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that Motion not being in his 
SRZHU¶$FDVXDOUHDGHUPLJKWWKLQNWKDWWKLVFRQWUDGLFWVZKDW,VD\KHUH
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for Locke seems to be imagining a man forming an anti-gravitational 
volition to stop falling through the air and into the water.  But presumably 
the preference for not falling, what he forms the volition to do, is to cross 
the river safely and drily, and when the bridge breaks, it is no longer in his 
SRZHUWRGRWKLV7RSXWLWDQRWKHUZD\µIDOOLQJ¶LVDPELJXRXVEHWZHHQWKH
evHQW RI ORVLQJ RQH¶V EDODQFH VOLSSLQJ HWF DQG WKH VXEVHTXHQW ORVV RI
altitude.  We should read Locke as concerned with the former, not the latter, 
here.  (Thanks to Sam Rickless for drawing this passage to my attention.) 
20. In this paragraph I am indebted to conversations with George Pappas and 
Sam Rickless about an earlier, less cautious, version of the paper. 
21. Some might object that I can try to wiggle my ears while not knowingly 
exerting the power to do so, since I have no idea whether I can do it or not 
until I try.  But it is not clear to me that someone who believes that some 
people do and some people do not have the ability to wiggle their ears can 
simply try to do it.  What they do is experiment with deliberate control of 
various muscles which they use in other actions to see what the effect is.  
They are trying to wiggle their ears in the sense that someone who buys a 
ticket is thereby trying to win the lottery. 
22. For cognate phrases, see PHK 93, 150, Alciphron III 10-11, IV 14, Siris 242. 
23. The case for Malebranche as a denier of blind agency is not as clear cut as 
Winkler makes out.  He omits to mention Search µ,QSODLQODQJXDJH
I mean that the will is a blind power, which can proceed only toward the 
WKLQJV WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ UHSUHVHQWV WR LW¶  ,W is worth comparing this 
WUDQVODWLRQ E\ /HQQRQ DQG 2OVFDPS   ZLWK 7KRPDV 7D\ORU¶V µ,
would say, to make use of the ordinary terms, that the Will is a blind Power, 
that can make no advances to things but what are represented to it by the 
UnderstandiQJ¶   ,W VHHPV WRPH WKDW7D\ORU¶VSKUDVH µRUGLQDU\
WHUPV¶GRHVQRWPHDQWKHYXOJDUWHUPVVRPXFKDVWKRVHZHDUHIDPLOLDUZLWK
LQSKLORVRSK\ :KLFKHYHU LVDEHWWHU WUDQVODWLRQRI WKHRULJLQDO7D\ORU¶V
SURYLGHVHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHSKUDVHµEOLQGSRZHU¶ZDVDSKLORVRSKLFDOWHUPRI
art he took to have a stable meaning. 
24. Cf his Antidote to AtheismµZHDUHWRLQIHUUHWKDWLWZDVHVWDEOLVKHGE\D
Principle that has in it Knowledge and Counsell, not from a blind fortuitous 
jumbling of the parts of the MaWWHURQHDJDLQVWDQRWKHU¶ 
25. I am not here assuming that knowing or at least not unreasonably believing 
one has a power to do something is knowing how to do it, but rather that 
knowingly exerting such a power is a form of know how. 
26. This sentence, ZLWK LWV WDON RI µXQWKLQNLQJ DJHQWV¶ PD\ ZHOO EH WKH
descendant of the blind agents passage from the Notebooks.  But it is not 
without its puzzles: is Berkeley claiming that we only know what follows 
the colon by experience, or is he saying that it is certain and furthermore 
EDFNHGXSE\H[SHULHQFH"2UGRHVµ7KXVPXFK¶UHIHUEDFNWRWKHSUHYLRXV
VHQWHQFH µThis making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly 
GHQRPLQDWHWKHPLQGDFWLYH¶, as it certainly would were the colon a full-
stop. 
27. This point was sugJHVWHGE\0LJHO\¶VFRPPHQWµ:HPD\QRWDOZD\VKDYH
a choice which ideas we relate together, but we are the cause of those 
UHODWLRQVRILGHDV¶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